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The natural progress of things is for liberty to yield and
government to gain ground.
– Thomas Jefferson, 1788.
Americans view their founding differently – some revere the United States
Constitution, admire the Founders, and share their ideological belief
system; others find various faults with the Revolution and the
Constitution. Yet Americans of all stripes can easily identify the
differences between the country in which they live today and the United
States of the late-eighteenth century. Specifically, Americans are struck by
*
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how the country, its culture, and its Constitution have been
fundamentally transformed since the late-nineteenth century.
The Civil War was a catalyst for this transformation. And the postwar
Constitutional Amendments were the tool by which this transformation
was accomplished. George Fletcher, a distinguished legal scholar at
Columbia Law School, refers to these Reconstruction Amendments
(Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments) as the Second
American Constitution because they created a new constitutional order
whose principles are “radically different from our original Constitution.”
It is indeed evident that the Reconstruction Amendments – and the
Fourteenth Amendment chief among them – represent a clear departure
from Madison’s Constitution.
In the generations that followed Reconstruction, Americans have
progressively embraced the Fourteenth Amendment’s constitutional
vision over Madison’s vision. They made the Fourteenth Amendment the
heart of their Constitution, and in doing so, they have purposefully
altered the primary function of the Constitution. The Fourteenth
Amendment has thus transformed the United States Constitution,
recasting it in its own image.
Madison’s Constitution
One of the American Revolution’s most vexing conundrums is why on
earth would colonial America’s leading families (the Washingtons,
Hancocks, Adamses, Morrisses, Jeffersons, et al.) lead a revolution. Why
would the families that had prospered most and gained the greatest
power and influence under the existing order want to change that existing
order? To ask the question is to open one’s eyes to the answer: when
Americans rebelled in 1775-76, they did not see themselves as agents of
change, but as agents of stability; they were resisting radical new policies
pushed by the imperial government and restoring the old imperial order.
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The Revolutionists grew up in an empire governed by the principle of
“salutary neglect” – what Americans later called “states’ rights.” Within
this traditional construction of the British Empire, the central government
in London did not involve itself directly in local governance in the
colonies. The British Empire was a loose confederation of self-governing
colonies under a weak central government. Edmund Burke coined the
term “salutary neglect” to explain the economic and demographic miracle
that had taken place in the colonies. As a free people, the British believed
that self-government was not only politically and morally just, but also
economically beneficial (salutary), because it allows communities to
pursue their economic interests freely.
The settlers were attached to the traditional imperial system of salutary
neglect. They complained and resisted when Parliament threatened their
long-held habit of self-government in the 1750s-70s; they went to war in
1775 to reinstate the old system of imperial governance; and when they
won the war, they recreated that system salutary neglect – a loose
confederation of self-governing states under a weak central government,
as outlined in the United States’ first constitution, the Articles of
Confederation (ratified in 1781). The Articles of Confederation preserved –
rather than changed – the old system of governance that Americans had
long enjoyed in the British Empire. Everything that the Revolutionists had
denied the British government before the war under the imperial
constitution – including the power to tax the states or their citizens – they
denied the new United States government.
This attachment to local government and government by consent was not
uniquely American but commonly English (or British). The intense fear of
centralized governance that sparked American resistance in the 1760s had
already produced two major rebellions in England in the 1640s and 1680s,
and two more in Scotland in the 1710s and 1740s. What was common to all
these British rebellions was a conviction that centralized power invites
abuse of power because it is arbitrary by its very nature. This British
political mentality rested on the widespread assumption that people with
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power will abuse it. The insistence on government by consent was simply
the practical remedy to this very human problem.
Revolutionary Americans’ fear of government officials was rooted in the
expectation that people with power will abuse it. Everything associated
with Anglo-American political culture flows from that dark
understanding of human nature – political institutions, legislative
protocols, the arcane procedures in British and American legislatures, the
attachment to local government and to local jury trials, procedures in
courts of law, and the fear of concentrating power in one person or in one
institution. It is in this context that Thomas Jefferson made his stoic
observation that “the natural progress of things is for liberty to yield and
government to gain ground.” James Monroe likewise noted humanity’s
difficulties throughout history “to preserve their dearest rights and best
privileges, impelled as it were by an irresistible fate of despotism.”
Once independent, Americans eyed the United States government with
the same suspicion and vigilance. With salutary neglect – or states’ rights
– as their constitutional guide, they crafted a constitution (the Articles of
Confederation) that created an emasculated central government unable to
impose its will on local communities. When Federalists tried to replace the
Articles of Confederation with a new constitution that promised to
strengthen the central government and curtail local communities’ ability
to govern themselves, it resuscitated pre-Revolutionary fears and
suspicions about centralized and arbitrary power. But the debates over the
proposed constitution did not reflect philosophical or ideological
differences between Federalists and Anti-Federalists – both sides shared a
negative view of human nature. Both sides believed that people with
power will abuse it. Both sides were convinced that governments are
necessary but also extremely dangerous.
James Madison explained that because the powers of government are
wielded by humans, one must expect abuses of power, arbitrary
government, lawlessness, and tyranny. Similarly, when George
Washington warned that occupants of public offices love power and are
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prone to abuse it, he was not suggesting that the people who are drawn to
government offices are power-hungry knaves. Rather, he expressed the
widely held Anglo-American understanding that all people – good and
bad – gravitate toward abuse of power when they acquire power.
Anti-Federalists saw this as a problem that cannot be solved. Thus, since
corruption and abuse in high places were inescapable facts of life, the
most any society can do is to do away with the high places. Like the
Revolutionists of 1776, they preferred to endure small local abuses from
small local governments than endure great abuses from a powerful central
government.
By contrast, Federalists tried to find a clever solution to the problem of
human nature. Madison’s formulation of a central government splintered
into separate branches, and strictly limited to a set of enumerated powers,
was a plan to cheat history. Federalists believed that the Federal
Government’s internal divisions would pit competing interest groups
against one another within this splintered structure of the Federal
Government, thus counteracting the gradual and natural concentration of
power that had characterized all previous governments in human history,
both monarchical and republican. This “separation of powers” within the
government itself (between the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the Federal Government, and between the two houses of
Congress) was going to act as an internal structural guardrail against the
consolidation of power in the central government. Additionally, this
internal structural guardrail was buttressed by an external (though
theoretical) guardrail – Madison’s insistence that the new central
government was limited, restricted by law, courts, local governments, and
public opinion to exercising only certain enumerated powers, and no others.
The ratification contest revealed that the American people were more
skeptical than Madison. To address Anti-Federalists’ concerns, Federalists
agreed to add to the Constitution, as a third guardrail, explicit
prohibitions against the Federal Government. These prohibitions – the ten
Amendments of the Bill of Rights – thus reflect the fears of eighteenth-
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century Americans that future Federal legislators, executives, and judges
might not be mindful of Madison’s safeguards. Americans feared that the
separation of powers and the doctrine of enumerated powers were
insufficient to interrupt what Jefferson called “the natural progress of
things.”
In this respect, the Bill of Rights is an Anti-Federalist document given that
it addressed Anti-Federalist warnings that the new powerful central
government could, in time, threaten self-government in the states and
wield arbitrary power, just as Parliament had done in the 1760s and ‘70s.
The Bill of Rights offered the First Amendment to answer those who
feared the central government might establish a national Church, regulate
speech, or break up public gatherings; it offered the 2nd Amendment to
those who feared the new government might restrict Americans’ ability to
possess firearms; it offered the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments to
those who feared the central government might do away with jury trials;
and so on and so forth.
Federalists did not have serious reservations about these prohibitions
against Federal activism because they too feared centralized power. They
never envisioned a central government that would reach into the states to
govern them directly. What they imagined was a large country
characterized by regional pluralism, in which localities with different
circumstances, interests, and cultures produced different governmental
systems and arrangements. Seeing government coercion as a necessary
evil, Federalists wished to resort to centralized power as a last resort.
Believing that local governments are more consensual, more accountable,
and less powerful than central governments, they wanted governance to
be primarily local.
The Federal Constitution therefore preserved tremendous autonomy for
states and localities to govern themselves and shape different policies on
religious worship, official state churches, slavery, freedom of speech,
freedom of assembly, guns, criminal procedures, and the like. States could
do what they wished on all these fronts under the Articles of
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Confederation, and this remained the case under the Constitution and Bill
of Rights. The Bill of Rights simply reinforced this pluralism through
explicit and absolute prohibitions against Federal interference in these
realms.
Even a casual reading of the Bill of Rights reveals that it does not
guarantee to Americans the various rights and freedoms it discusses. It
does not proclaim that Americans can speak freely, worship freely, bear
arms at will, or be safe from arbitrary arrest; it merely denies the newly
established Federal Government powers that were widely understood to
belong to local governments – the power to tell inhabitants what they may
and may not say, the power to establish an official Church, the power to
outlaw certain religious practices, and the power to restrict the use or
ownership of guns.
The language of the Bill of Rights is absolutist on religion, speech, and
guns not because eighteenth-century Americans were absolutists on these
issues; they were not. The authors of the Constitution and of the Bill of
Rights believed that people's various liberties (such as speech, assembly,
religious worship, and gun ownership) can and should be curtailed by
their governments in various ways. They insisted, however, that the
United States’ central government have no role in such curtailments. It
was universally understood that the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights
applied exclusively to the Federal Government.
The citizens of the various states thus remained as free as they had been
under the Articles of Confederation (and under Britain’s old imperial
system) to restrict speech, establish an official Church, outlaw certain
religious practices, enact gun control measures, and determine their own
criminal court procedures. Thus, some states retained established state
Churches well into the nineteenth century; it was not unconstitutional,
and when these state Churches were eventually dismantled, it was
done not by the authority of the Bill of Rights but by the legislatures or
courts of those states.
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The absolutist prohibitions in the Bill of Rights are not evidence that
Americans were absolutists on those issues. They are evidence that
Americans were absolutists about barring the Federal Government – and
the Federal Government alone – from acting on those local matters. This is
why citizens and non-citizens enjoyed the same protections under the Bill
of Rights. The Bill of Rights does not list the people, or categories of
people, who may speak freely, bear arms, assemble freely, or worship
freely. It only lists the one government – the Federal Government – that
was prohibited from restricting these activities.
The transformation of the Federal Constitution
The notion that the Bill of Rights instructs local governments on what they
can and cannot do with regard to speech, religion, guns, and criminalcourt procedures is a twentieth-century novelty. That is how Americans
read the Constitution today, but it was not how the people who wrote the
Constitution wrote it and understood it in the eighteenth century. And it
is not how Americans read and understood the Constitution throughout
the nineteenth century.
In the twentieth century, Americans devised a new way to read the
Constitution, a new way to apply it to their daily lives. This innovation in
Constitutional jurisprudence has been pivotal in the transformation of the
United States from a federated republic in which local communities
governed themselves, into a modern managerial nation-state that is
governed from the center.
The key to this transformation was the Fourteenth Amendment, enacted
in the aftermath of the Civil War. The Fourteenth Amendment was a
product of unique postwar circumstances, and it was ratified with the
purpose of empowering the Federal Government to “reconstruct” the
defeated South; that is, to reshape political institutions, practices, and
culture in the Southern states as they prepared to re-enter the Union.
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When the United States tried to reconstruct Germany and Japan as liberal
democracies after World War II, it was done with the expectation that if
Germany and Japan became democratic like the United States, then they
would not start another world war. After the Civil War, the Northern
states likewise hoped that by remaking the South in their own image, they
would put an end to the longstanding intersectional friction that had
intensified steadily since the 1790s.
Thus, unlike the ten amendments that comprise the Bill of Rights, the
Fourteenth Amendment did not contain prohibitions against the Federal
Government but prohibitions against state governments. In the context of
the multitude of liberated slaves in the South, the Fourteenth Amendment
did the following things:
(1) established the Federal Government as the arbiter of citizenship in the
United States.
(2) conferred citizenship on the freed slaves.
(3) prohibited states from curtailing the rights and privileges (that is,
liberties) of American citizens without due process of law, or denying
any of their residents “the equal protection of the laws.”
The clash between the pre-Civil War Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment is thus easily apparent. The Constitution provides the
structure for limited government by constraining Federal authority. To
buttress these restrictions, the Bill of Rights provides explicit limitations
on Federal power. The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, provides the
structure for the opposite type of government – it empowers the central
government to act within local jurisdictions on a vast spectrum of issues,
ranging from the most public (elections, policing, criminal law, public
education) to the most private (commerce, religion, housing, medicine,
home defense, marriage, family life, nutrition, sports, civic associations…).
Whereas the pre-Civil War Constitutional Amendments envisioned the
states as the defenders of the people against Federal encroachment and
abuse, the Fourteenth Amendment did the opposite. With the South’s new
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black citizens in mind, the Fourteenth Amendment not only identified the
state governments as potential threats to the citizenry, it empowered the
Federal government to monitor, curtail, and correct abusive or predatory
conduct by local governments.
The Northerners who won that war at such a high cost needed these
former slaves to become active and effective citizens of the Southern states
for those states to be “reconstructed” the way the North wanted them
reconstructed. Thus, in contrast to the pre-Civil War Constitution and Bill
of Rights, which limited Federal power and jurisdiction within the states,
the Fourteenth Amendment created new jurisdictions and new powers for
the Federal Government in the states. It is no surprise, therefore, that
when one traces the process by which the Federal Government has
extended its authority and reach into the localities in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, one finds that most of the centralizing reforms have
been accomplished through reference to, reliance on, and application of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The post-Civil War Constitution was thus a house divided against itself.
As Abraham Lincoln pointed out on another matter altogether, a house
divided against itself cannot stand; it must “become all one thing, or all
the other.” And indeed, in the century and a half that followed the Civil
War, the Fourteenth Amendment established itself at the heart of the
Constitution and remade it in its own image. This transformation took
place in the early-twentieth century, when Federal courts began citing the
Fourteenth Amendment (specifically, its due-process and equal-protection
clauses) to “incorporate” – that is, to apply – the Bill of Rights to state and
municipal governments.
Whereas until then it was universally understood that the Bill of Rights
restricted the Federal Government alone, the courts used the
“incorporation doctrine” to apply the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights also
to state and local governments. By the late-twentieth century, the
incorporation doctrine had become a firmly entrenched orthodoxy in
American legal and political culture. It placed the Federal Government
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(Federal courts first and foremost) as a guarantor of civil rights in every
locality in America. The incorporation doctrine thus invited the Federal
Government to supervise, police, and correct local governments in matters
that had long been understood as purely local and beyond the jurisdiction
of the central government.
“Incorporation” thus allowed the Fourteenth Amendment to create the
kind of strong central government that Madison’s Constitution had
explicitly aimed to prevent – a central government that is empowered to
govern the states and towns of America. The incorporation doctrine has
even turned the Bill of Rights on its head, transforming it from a
document that plainly and explicitly prohibited the Federal Government
from acting in any way in various realms of American life into a document
that not only allows the Federal Government to act in these realms but
indeed compels it to act. It compels the Federal Government to intervene if a
municipality establishes an official Church, punishes a citizen for
speaking his/her mind, confiscates a citizen’s guns, or searches his/her
trunk without a warrant.
The incorporation doctrine itself is the ultimate proof that the Fourteenth
Amendment indeed clashes with Madison’s Constitution. The many
jurists who invented the incorporation doctrine, and the multitudes of
jurists who have embraced and expanded it since then, all sensed this
incompatibility. They understood that to adhere to the Fourteenth
Amendment, Federal authorities needed a mechanism to hurdle the
Constitution’s barriers against Federal power.
If the Fourteenth Amendment could live in harmony with Madison’s
Constitution, there would be no need to invent the incorporation doctrine.
The incorporation doctrine harmonizes between two competing
constitutional visions by ordaining that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
vision shall govern and Madison’s vision shall yield.
The process of granting the central government powers that the
Constitution had withheld (or explicitly prohibited) started long before
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the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment. It started, in fact, as soon
as the ink dried on the pages of the Bill of Rights. The incorporation
doctrine should therefore be seen in the context of a Federal Government
that was slowly, incrementally, but consistently gathering more powers
within the states and over the states in the seventy years that preceded the
Civil War. The incorporation doctrine was merely the boldest and most
explicit method that Americans have devised over the centuries to liberate
their national government from the straitjacket imposed on it by the
framers of the Federal Constitution.
Madison’s Constitution featured two “parchment barriers” – mere words
scribbled on parchment – against the growth of Federal power. The first of
Madison’s parchment barriers was the doctrine of enumerated powers
(articulated explicitly in the Constitution’s Article 1, Section 8, and again
in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the Bill of Rights). This doctrine
stated that the Federal Government was authorized to perform only a
limited set of tasks that were plainly listed – enumerated, itemized – in the
pages of the Federal Constitution.
The second parchment barrier was the remainder of the Bill of Rights –
Amendments one through eight. Even before the ink on the Bill of Rights
was dry, however, both these obstacles were overcome by creative
reading of the Constitution.
When Thomas Jefferson and James Madison cited the doctrine of
enumerated powers, and the ninth and tenth Amendments, to oppose
Alexander Hamilton’s Bank Bill in 1791, Hamilton countered that the
Constitution’s “necessary and proper” clause actually granted Congress
implied powers beyond the explicit powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Both Congress and President Washington affirmed
Hamilton’s expansive reading of the Constitution, as did the Supreme
Court years later (McCulloch vs. Maryland, 1819).
The story of the 1791 Bank Bill thus offers a guide to the future course of
American Constitutional history. It reveals to historians, as it did to
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Jefferson and Madison at the time, that the parchment barriers and
backstops in the Constitution and Bill of Rights were too weak to
counteract “the natural progress of things.”
In the decades that followed, Federal officials and judges continued to
find additional implied powers not only in the Constitution’s “necessary
and proper” clause but also in its “commerce clause” and “general welfare
clause.” In this way, the Federal Government’s field of jurisdiction
expanded gradually, but progressively, well before the Fourteenth
Amendment. But this incremental and slow process went into overdrive
when the Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation doctrine
completely transformed the national government into a government of
innumerable powers and responsibilities.
The transformation of the Federal Government
Ruth Bader Ginsburg once explained that laws and constitutions are just
words on parchment; what gives meaning and force to these words are
the legal and constitutional beliefs of the people. When examining the
fundamental transformation of the United States Constitution over time, it
is evident that the citizens’ Constitutional beliefs changed first. America’s
law schools and courts followed the citizens’ lead. From the founding of
the Federal Government – long before the Fourteenth Amendment, but
increasingly thereafter – Americans demanded Washington solutions to
problems that in the past had been understood as local: weighty concerns
such as slavery, poor relief, and racial discrimination, and less weighty
matters such as college football, pollution, diet, crime, education, and
wages. Federal officials responded by vigorously tackling these various
issues. American law schools and courts likewise responded to this public
demand – by interpreting the supreme law of the land in ways that
allowed these Federal interventions (executive, legislative, and judicial) to
stand as Constitutional.
Madison’s most effective and lasting barrier against Federal activism in
American life, therefore, was not the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights was

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

always just a piece of paper, a parchment barrier. Madison’s most effective
and lasting barrier against Federal activism in the localities where
Americans live has always been the structure of the Federal Government
itself.
Future generations of Americans could choose their own path when
confronting the Constitution’s parchment barriers – they could apply
those prohibitions selectively or universally, interpret them loosely or
strictly, understand them figuratively or literally, ignore them altogether,
or revise them with new Constitutional Amendments. But these future
generations had no choice but to occupy the Federal institutions of
government bequeathed to them by the framers of the Constitution.
By creating wholly separate branches of government – legislative,
executive, and judicial – and by splitting the Congress into two separate
legislatures, the framers hoped to compel future generations to observe
their strictures against the concentration of power. These built-in fractures
within the central government were to create competing powers within it,
with different institutions checking and obstructing others. The byproduct
of such a divided and internally conflicted government was liberty for the
citizenry.
Yet, even on this front, Americans have proved too ingenious for the
Founders. While the Federal Government still features the same internal
structural divisions the framers had instituted in 1787, Americans have
coalesced around political parties whose function it is to paper over and
mitigate these institutional divisions between House, Senate, White
House, and Federal Court. Thus, when these four institutions are
controlled by the same party, the party in power is able to get these
different institutions to work together harmoniously, like a team,
something Madison’s Constitution meant to prevent.
The purpose of a written constitution is to compel future generations to
live by rules set for them by a previous generation. Given that Americans
have the world’s oldest written constitution still in use, it is
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understandable that they have chafed under the restrictions imposed on
them by a generation of Americans long dead.
The country’s founding generation was animated by a conviction that
people with power will abuse it. This was the underlying belief at the
heart of English political culture in the early-modern era. It manifested
itself in the great events of that era – the English Civil War, Glorious
Revolution, Jacobite rebellions, and American Revolution. And it
manifested itself in the way English communities governed themselves
daily in their localities. This conviction about human nature shaped the
rules and procedures Anglo-Americans instituted in their courts of law,
churches, civic associations, and local and central governments.
The framers of the Federal Constitution shared this conviction about
human nature and human governments, and thus tried to prevent the
concentration of governmental power in the central government that they
were creating at the Federal Convention in 1787. They believed that “the
greater the power, the more dangerous the abuse.” They were not seeking,
therefore, to remove roadblocks and impediments from the path of the
powerful national government they created; quite the contrary. Like the
framers of the English Bill of Rights, the framers of the American
Constitution designed a system in which local communities governed
themselves and were shielded from the central government. They feared
the central government just as the Anti-Federalists did. So when AntiFederalists warned that the new Federal Government would stretch and
break the constitutional boundaries created for it by the 1787 Constitution,
the framers agreed to add a Bill of Rights as a bulwark against such
Federal aggrandizement.
But just as America’s founding generation gave political form to its
convictions about human nature and human governments in the
Constitution and Bill of Rights, modern Americans have given political
form to their own political and philosophical beliefs – with the Fourteenth
Amendment, the incorporation doctrine, and the doctrine of the “living
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Constitution.” These three new elements reflect a transformation in the
way Americans view their national government.
Americans have learned over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries to trust the Federal Government, identify with it, bond with it
emotionally, look to it for moral and political leadership, and to expect
numerous services and protections from it. This reflects a philosophical
sea-change in Americans’ understanding of human nature – they are no
longer convinced that people with power will abuse it – and it explains
Americans’ frustration with life under an eighteenth-century Constitution
animated by distrust and fear of central governance. This change in how
Americans view their national government explains their continual efforts
to empower and liberate it from the Constitutional constraints placed on it
by Madison and his colleagues.
The Founders would doubtless have been pleasantly surprised that their
construction of limited government survived the citizens’ impulses for as
long as it did – more than a full century (from 1789 to roughly 1900). After
all, the failure of the Constitution to prevent the concentration of power in
the central government was not only predictable, it was predicted as the
natural progress of things.
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